By Bryan D. Milstead
NASA, despite its prestige and innovation, is no exception to the phenomenon of failure. Failure can be overwhelmingly devastating (such as the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster which claimed the lives of seven crew members) (Myers, 2021, slide 3) and sometimes, downright discouraging (i.e. the 1999 Mars Polar Lander software malfunctions that compromised millions of dollars in equipment) (Times of India, 2024, slide 6). However, it is imperative that we do not permanently disregard these mistakes. Instead, scientists and engineers alike should feel propelled to revisit these lessons and, above all, continue to aim for the highest levels of security. Former NASA director Phil McAlister states it perfectly: “All organizations have a culture, and it’s almost like the DNA associated with an organization. [The Challenger Mission] has a history and a memory. Even though people come and go, that DNA is always there” (Howell, 2021, para. 13). NASA’s dedication to examining past mishaps highlights their broader goal of innovating for humanity, rather than simply sweeping catastrophes under the rug.
LADEE was a vending-machine sized vehicle deployed into lunar orbit to analyze the Moon’s atmosphere, ultimately providing insights regarding the composition of other nearby celestial bodies (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2024, para. 14). According to NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), LADEE was “the first lunar mission to be launched out of Wallops Flight Facility” and “the first spacecraft ever to be designed, integrated, tested and built at Ames Research Center (ARC).”(NASA Office of Safety & Mission Assurance [OSMA], 2014). To put it another way, this mission was important not only from a scientific standpoint, but also in laying the groundwork for space voyages at some of the world’s finest institutions.
Although LADEE ended up being an overall successful mission, technical setbacks still occurred, resulting in damage to the spacecraft as well as certain testing devices. On May 3, 2012, LADEE underwent sine burst testing, which is a method often utilized for evaluating the strength of aerospace hardware (NASA, n.d., para. 1). It is important to note that there was a discrepancy pertaining to the test’s software calibration, in which the Test Director decided to delete lower-level decibel quantities in order to decrease the amount of cyclic loading (stress applied to a material in a recurring pattern) as much as possible (NASA Safety Center [NSC], 2015, para. 9). For some reason, neither the Test Director nor the Test Engineer realized that the shaker control system requires those very low-level, wide-band pulses that they erroneously erased prior to sine burst testing. Of course, since protocols were not properly followed, the sliptable that housed LADEE suffered from a severe malfunction which harmed both apparatuses (NSC, 2015, para. 10).
However, this incident possessed a multitude of layers that piled upon one another, amalgamating into a recipe for disaster. For example, the sliptable showed signs of damage even before the experiment (NSC, 2015, para. 16). Furthermore, subsequent investigations unveiled an epiphanic piece of information: members of the LADEE team were either poorly trained to work
the test machinery, or showed a great inability to carry out the LADEE Risk Management Plan (NSC, 2015, para. 16). These strategic frameworks, regardless of the mission, are crucial for any project that involves many meticulous processes and uncertainties. To elaborate, it serves as the glue holding together all NASA agency activities, engaging in the effective evaluation of “what if?” scenarios (NASA OSMA, 2025, para. 1).
According to the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, “all forms of Risk Management [at NASA] consist of two main processes: Risk- (and Opportunity-) Informed Decision Making [as well as] Continuous Risk (and Opportunity) Management” (paras. 4-5). The former comprises elements of alternative decision-making to assess solution feasibility in the event of an issue, whereas the latter emphasizes the actual implementation of said solution. On a fundamental level, both types of Risk Management address various mission domains including safety, technicality (ex. information acquisition), cost, and scheduling obligations (NASA OSMA, 2011, p. 3).
With regards to the LADEE team and their nebulous understanding of testing responsibilities, a plethora of actions could’ve been taken to ensure that each team member fully understood the mechanisms they were operating. It is critical to point out that NASA had little involvement in the execution of this testing initiative: rather, it was predominantly the contractor.. Greater surveillance should’ve been carried out by the contractor at their facility to catch any mistakes prior to testing. Moreover, there should’ve been a greater adherence to the plethora of safety practices/protocols (namely, the LADEE System Safety and Mission Assurance Implementation Plan (SMAIP), LADEE Risk Management Plan, and LADEE Sine Burst Test Plan) (NSC, 2015, para. 17). Team members unfamiliar with sine burst testing needed an in-depth opportunity to gain experience with sine burst testing, not just for a few hours in the weeks leading up to the test.
Finally, to emphasize a broader perspective when analyzing the pros/cons of an engineering endeavor, we will touch upon different types of risks. In the LADEE mission, there was an associated risk even before team members carried out testing. This is precisely because the Ames Research Center (entity in charge of overall LADEE management) was incapable of implementing sine burst testing, causing them to partner with a third-party, off-site contractor (NSC, 2015, para. 3). This circumstance alone bears a sense of uncertainty pertaining to the reliability of the contractor, given the fact that they were not directly involved in the creation of LADEE. Worker safety is another risk to consider. Fortunately, when the LADEE sliptable malfunctioned, no human beings were injured thanks to a control system that allowed for an automatic shutdown (NSC, 2015, para. 9). Other risks include major system failures (though unlikely) and increased failure probability of tests due to device complexity (Eby, 2023). The latter is specifically in reference to sine burst testing, especially considering the intricacies that are involved with running it.
All of this is not to point the blame at a specific organization, or chastise them for any sort of perceived incompetence. When evaluating logistic-heavy topics such as these, we must develop a multifaceted perspective to consider all of the stages that contextualize a specific event. Ultimately, it is this refusal to let preconceived notions affect our work that allows us to enact positive change in our world, even in the face of repeated adversity. LADEE should serve as a testament to this principle; that failure cannot only be overcome, but also propel us to improve existing guidelines, just as NASA revised a section of their test method standards to improve sine burst test understanding (NSC, 2015, paras. 22-23).
References
Eby, K. (2023). How to Create a Project Risk Management Plan. SmartSheet. https://www.smartsheet.com/content/project-risk-management-plan
Howell, E. (2021). The lessons learned from the fatal Challenger shuttle disaster echo at NASA 35 years on. Space.com.
https://www.space.com/space-shuttle-challenger-disaster-35th-anniversary-2021 Myers, H. (2021). Lessons from Challenger. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/safety-messages/january-2021-lessons-from-cha llenger-presentation.pdf?sfvrsn=ab69c7f8_2
NASA Engineering and Safety Center. (n.d.). Best Practices for Use of Sine Burst Testing. NASA.
https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/nesc-tb-15-02-best-practices-for-use of-sine-burst-testing.pdf
NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. (2011). NASA Risk Management Handbook. OSMA.
https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/nasa-risk-mgmt-handbook.pdf NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. (2025). Risk Management. OSMA. https://sma.nasa.gov/sma-disciplines/risk-management
NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). (2014). Cross-Agency SMA Team Overcame Unique Challenges with LADEE. OSMA.
https://sma.nasa.gov/news/articles/newsitem/2014/12/16/cross-agency-sma-team-overca
me-unique-challenges-with-ladee#:~:text=%E2%80%9CLADEE%20created%20many% 20new%20experiences,oversight%20for%20the%20new%20requirements NASA Safety Center (NSC). (2015). All Shook Up – The LADEE Spacecraft Vibration Mishap. System Failure Case Study, 8(3), 4.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RE26q6I-vyB_5rpXGfAD8ONSkhE1N377/view National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2024). What We Learned From LADEE. NASA. https://science.nasa.gov/mission/ladee/outcome/
Times of India. (2024). 7 epic failures of NASA in history. Times Entertainment | By The Times of India.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/etimes/trending/7-epic-failures-of-nasa-in-history/ph otostory/113017626.cms
Edited by Ferhia Ibro
Astra Stem 
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